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Zhou King Muwang's Travels 
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The Scourge-of-God-Tetralogy: From the Khitans to the Jurchens & Mongols: A History of Barbarians in Triangle Wars and Quartet Conflicts (available at iUniverse; Google; Amazon; B&N) |
AMERICAN AID TO CHINA ? ***)
Continuing from Tragedy of Chinese Revolution, Campaigns & Civil Wars, & White Terror vs Red Terror: After reading through the memoirs by Chiang Kai-shek's attache and secretaries, this webmaster could not explain the riddles about the fast fall of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Blaming on the corruption by the Kung-Soong families, on the Whampoa lineage generals, on the communist espionage, and on the communist propaganda did not explain the whole issue. This webmaster was at one time still hot on Chiang Kai-shek's money trail without deriving any satisfactory explanation. After reading the book TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE, this webmaster found answers. What this webmaster was surprised about is that someone already saw through the riddles. It is just the cover-up and ignoring by the mainstream academics that buried the gem in the sand. What this webmaster is referring to here is the following writing by some brave woman called Freda Utley.
This webmaster's previous doubt about "Acheson's 2 billion aid" was completely answered here. There is no need to find the original crap written by Acheson for comparison. Freda Utley did it for us dozens of years ago. The aid of 2 billion U.S. dollars was a crap. Evidence reinforced this webmaster's conviction that a full house of the Soviet spies, who controlled the U.S. Treasury Department and the State Department, worked to destroy Republican China on behalf of the Soviets. G Marshall, as Wedemeyer said, first armed China and then disarmed China. The U.S. arms embargo continued till the China Aid Act of 1948, and ammunition did not get released till November of 1948. (In contrast, the cunning British, breaking the embargo, gave Chiang a dozen of warships to put off China's demand for recovering Hongkong, something the British promised to return after the victory over Japan to avoid damage to the British wartime morale. In the aftermath of the May 1947 Menglianggu Campaign debacle, Chiang Kai-shek, in deep remorse, renamed one of the British bribery warships by the name of Lingfu in commemoration of General Zhang Linfu.) After further reading of Wellington Koo's memoirs, the impression was that George Marshall was the most evil of all, and had NO integrity, and always flip-flopped on the matter of China, and was determined to destroy the R.O.C. at any excuse and on any pretext. Marshall's hands had the blood of millions of Chinese killed in the Chinese civil wars. As disclosed by the documents at the George Marshall foundation, George Marshall, possibly the most hideous agent working on behalf of Stalin and the Soviet Union, saved the ass of the Chinese Communists with a threat to withhold the economic aid that was supposedly coming from the U.S. export-import bank, which never materialized. Marshall, in spring 1946, flew back to China to stop the Chinese army from moving beyond the Sungari River.
In the past decade, a new generation of academics had emerged on the mainland China and reflected on the communist ascension to power in the 1949, including Yang Kuisong, Gao Hua, Niu Jun, Zhang Baijia, Dai Chaowu, Shen Zhidan & Li Danhui and et al. But none of them wished to become China's Sakharov as Fang Lizhi had attempted prior to June 4th, 1989 Massacre. We could not put blame on the courage and conscience of people still in China, though; the mere mentioning of their names could give them trouble, and the banning of their personal websites. The conscience of China, meanwhile, had undergone setbacks in the information age that would supposedly open up China. Yahoo, for instance, has admitted to sharing the user information for journalist Shi Tao with the Chinese communist authorities earlier this year in a move that landed him a 10-year jail term. In doing so, the firm 'complied with local Chinese law', according to Yahoo spokeswoman Mary Osako. Outside of China, Yu Maochun, as late as in his book "OSS In China", still failed to see through the agenda of Joseph Stilwell, as seen in Foreign Military Aid and Assistance to China. Stilwell, who took over the post originally set for Drum, was to execute George Marshall's agenda of "Germany First & Asia Second", i.e., a Soviet spies' agenda and a British design to choke the Republic of China to make sure China would not emerge from the world war to be victorious. Some overseas dissidents, like Cao Changqing, et al., had a blind faith in the so-called "American generosity" and the Republican Party's doctrines of 'democracy, freedom and liberty' as a result of delusion over the intermittent American for-show statements, like the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson's 14 Points, the Hull "ultimatum" of November 26th, 1941, & the American opposition to the British-Franco's colonialist activities in the Middle East, etc. In or outside China, they failed to see the in-depth of the Russian/Comintern conspiracy against China. They have not come to discern the American plays of the Chinese cards, and are still arguing among themselves, blindfolded by the Acheson's 2 Billion Crap aid to Nationalist China and Marshall's Dupe Mission To China & the Arms Embargo, not to mention i) American President Grant's attempt at making Manchu China divide Ryukyu into three parts with Japan, ii) John Watson Foster's collusion with the Japanese in selling the Shimonoseki Treaty, iii) the American navy's sailing gunboats and warships in the Yangtze to protest against the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, iv) the American navy's sailing gunboats and warships into the 'White Swan Pond' of Canton to protest against Sun Yat-sen's customs tax withholding, v) J.P. Morgan and the Wall Street's floating $263 million in loans to the Japanese by 1931 while refusing to aid China on the pretext of isolationism, vi) America's continuing sale of scrap metals and petrol oil after the Japanese sinking of Panay in 1937, and vii) America's selling out China at the Yalta and colluding with the Soviet Russians in subversion of Nationalist China. What the Chinese side did not and does not understand about the Yalta Betrayal & the George Marshal Dupe Mission is that two factions of the Anglo-American interest groups, i.e., the ranks of innate cousins of the British colonialists and the ranks of the American doctrinists with advocacy for the "China containment" [or the containment of the Yellow Peril], had joined hands with the Soviet/Comintern agents in subverting the Republic of China.
The Truman crap cited by Yuanyuan Peng in "The Chinese Banking Industry: Lessons from History for Today's Challenges": I discovered after some time that Chiang Kaishek and the Madame and their families, the Soong family and the Kungs, were all thieves, every last one of them, the Madame and Him included, And they stole 750 million dollars out of the [US$3.5] billion that were sent to Chiang. They stole it, and it is invested in real estate down in Sao Paulo and some right here in New York. (Miller 1974:289) The Truman crap cited by Harry Gelbe in "The Dragon and the Foreign Devils: China and the World, 1100 B.C. to the Present": They're all thieves, every damned one of them. They stole 750 million out of the billions that we sent to China. They stole it, and it's invested in real estate down in SAao Paolo and some right here in New York. William S. Youngman, who served as President Roosevelt's representative to the "China Defense Supplies" during WWII and became a lifelong friend of Tse Vung Soong (TV Soong), later acted as the last will executor for Tse Vung Soong executor statement (available from the Hoover Library and showing assets of $1.125,986 which derived mostly from the capital gains of stock investments), rebutted Seagrave's accusation, and pierced the rumors as to the Soong family's corruption. Communist China's Social Science Academy chief Liu Da’nian acknowledged that Chiang Kai-shek received no more than 0.6 billion in aid. The actual number won't be more than 0.2 to 0.3 billion, including the 0.125 billion from the 1948 China Aid Act which rolled over to the "China Area Aid", to be squandered in Indochina in the 1950s and 1960s, instead. After weapons were shipped out, with the first ship leaving Seattle, Acheson and the undercover Russian agents further attempted to order the ships to turn around at Guam and Okinawa. At about the same time the Republican Party forced through the China Aid Act in 1948, Stalin officially stamped a loan for the Chinese communists of equivalent amount allocated by the China Aid Act, with no strings attached. 1913 Chinese Reorganization Gold Bonds: The Republic of China, for dealing with financial insolvency and dismissing the soldiers from the 1911 revolution, resorted to imperialist powers for huge loans which did not get approved till after Song Jiaoren's assassination death on March 20th, 1913. Tang Shaoyi first initiated the loan request for 8,5000,000 taels of silver with four countries of Britain, the U.S., Germany & France whereas Japan and Russia joined in for profiteering soon. This is commonly known as the 1913 Chinese Reorganization gold bonds. The 1913 "aftermath borrowing", commonly labeled as Yuan Shikai's reorganized gold loan and known as the "1913 Chinese Reorganization Gold Bonds", was restructured in the 1930s together with the old debts of the Qing dynasty. The southwest China's railway loans that triggered the 1911 Xin Hai Revolution as a result of the Manchu attempt at nationalizing the railways for transfer to the international synarchists, was paid a coupon and interests again in 1928. This loan, with the British, German and American funds, became the poster child auctioned on the EBay today. The Hu-guang (Hukuang) loan, together with the Tientsin-Pukow railway loan, were pledged by the customs and salt revenue tax. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the salt taxes that were robbed by the Japanese made China default on the two railway loans, portion of which belonged to the Americans. The two railway loans, which were barely reorganized and reinstated in the early part of 1937, fell back again after the Japanese invaded China and seized all ports along the coast. After the restructuring of the 'aftermath loan' in 1913, the United States withdrew from the six-nation consortium. In 1920, a new four-nation consortium was formed; however, this consortium did not give any loan to China on the pretext of not offending Japan. The United States had never given a loan to China before 1931. The only loan was the refunds of the Boxer Indemnity Fund. According to Diana Preston's The Boxer Rebellion, Michael Hunt of Yale University in May 1972 concluded in an Journal of Asian Studies article that U.S. Secretary Hay knew at the beginning that the American claims for the boxers' indemnities were exaggerated and excessive; that Roosevelt ignored the Chinese claim for refunding the surplus and procrastinated the refund for as long as possible; and that Roosevelt approved the partial refund only after the Chinese side softened the positions to allow the refund to be used according to the American wish, namely, the Chinese side proposed the usage of funds for educating the Chinese studies in America. Mike Billington, in "How London, Wall Street Backed Japan's War Against China and Sun Yat Sen", pointed out that "the House of Morgan, functioning as an arm of British imperial policy within the United States, first became seriously involved with the formation of a bankers' Consortium for China, in 1909, consisting of banking interests from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. The British, under Hongkong and Shanghai Bank chief Sir Charles Addis, took overall direction of the Consortium, with a J.P. Morgan representative leading the American Group. Although the Consortium did finance a Shanghai-to-Canton rail line, their primary task was to prop up the decayed Ching dynasty against the mounting republican revolutionary pressure". In the 1930s, the Nanking government of the Republic of China again reorganized the old debts of the Peking government of the Republic of China. After the Sino-Japanese War, this restructured debts' payments were stopped because the payment of the external debts, which were securitized by the customs and salt taxes under the supervision of the powers, were taken over by the Japan-installed puppet governments and deposited to the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank. The powers, since 1938, colluded with the Japanese in depositing China's customs tax and salt tax, i.e., the funds reserved for the payment of the reorganized R.O.C. bonds, in the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank, hence forfeiting the claim to payment of the principal and interests on the R.O.C. debts --that was reorganized in the 1930s to have included the Peking government's debts, i.e., 1913 Chinese Reorganization gold bonds, plus the Manchu debts such as the Huguang railroad and public works debt in what's now Hebei Province and three other southern and southwestern provinces. (Republic of China, in light of the force majeure event and the fact that the powers colluded with Japan in intercepting the custom taxes, announced in January 1939 that the debt payments would be stopped after the strenuous efforts at making such payments throughout 1937-1938 and that the powers should seek payments of the principal and interests with Japan, instead. Later, in 1950, the U.S., which again betrayed the R.O.C. in excluding the R.O.C. Taiwan government from the treaty signatory ceremony, reached a consensus with the rest of powers in relinquishing the wartime damages against Japan, which in the sense of international law nullified the claims to the R.O.C. reorganized bonds that were securitized by the customs tax and salt tax that were robbed by the Japanese. The San Francisco Treaty of Peace in 1950-1951 required countries to abandon claims for the financial losses caused by the Japanese aggression, including the claims related to the Chinese war time loss of the customs duties and salt tax. The powers, in relinquishing the wartime damages against Japan, nullified the claims to the R.O.C. reorganized bonds that were securitized by the customs tax and salt tax that were robbed by the Japanese. From this point of view, alone, the European powers or the United States lost the recourse to recover debts with payments ceased due to the Sino-Japanese war.) Two American Financial Loans of the Early 1930s: The Roosevelt government, which was hijacked by the leftists and communists, deliberately avoided helping China on the excuse that any aid to China could be used by Chiang Kai-shek to fight the civil war against the Red Army. Throughout the 1930s, there were only two loans: (Throughout the first part of the 20th century, the Americans never bothered to provide aid to China, with Paul Reinsch, i.e., American minister to China, circumventing the Morgan house-controlled consortium to liaison with the Chicago banks for loaning money to China. The Morgan house, a lackey of the Japanese imperialists, had deflected the China financing on the pretext of not offending Japan.) Pre-lend-lease Amounts: On April 1st, America agreed to provide a loan of 50 million U.S. dollars for equalizing the foreign exchange rate with the Chinese "fa bi" (legalized currency). On April 25th, 1941, Soong Ziwen (T.V. Soong) and the American finance minister made a joint announcement that the U.S. would supply a loan of 50,000,000 U.S. dollars while Britain would supply 5 million pounds for standardizing the exchange rate of China's "fa bi" (legalized currency). British-provided funds were restricted to deployment on the Shanghai Bund, which basically fell into the hands of Japan-controlled companies. Both the American and British loans and usage in the foreign exchange market were subject to cancellation with short notice as well as requiring the British/American government approvals. Per Francis Pike, Roosevelt sealed a deal with Congress on December 2nd to provide China with two US$50 million loans. What Pike meant by two loans could be the loan agreement signed back on April 1st, 1940, that designated the purpose of the first $50 million for the Chinese currency stabilization and an additional $50 million credit for purchase of supplies, that was said by Pike to be utilized to buy 100 Curtis P-40 Kittyhawk fighter planes -- that were later shipped to Rangoon for Chennault's Flying Tigers and prior to engagement with the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, numbered about one third left after wear and tear from training. Unpositive Neutrality: The ultimate American intervention in China in March 1940, i.e., the Americans' hastily giving Chiang Kai-shek a badly-needed loan, would be to prevent Japan and China from reaching a truce after Chiang Kai-shek deliberately spread a rumor that his Chongqing (Chungking) government could merge with the puppet Nanking government. This is after what Utley called by "unpositive neutrality" against the 'belligerent' countries, namely, Japan and China, which was free and unrestrained arms sale to Japan and de facto arms embargo against China. Note that the arms embargo only hurt China since China did not have an industrial base to produce the basic weapons while Japan's factories could roll out the warships and airplanes on a wholesale scale. Also note that in contrast with the Americans, the European powers, being constrained by the mediation role of the League of Nations, dared not openly sell arms to Japan. Through 1940-1941, prior to the U.S. revocation of the 1911 U.S.-Japan Commerce Treaty, the Americans were the biggest supplier of raw material, oil, aviation oil, and weapons, to the extent that some U.S. senator called by Scott making a claim that out of every one million Chinese killed by the Japanese, 544,000 Chinese were killed by the Americans. Thirty-one U.S. congressional members made a joint declaration to the effect that the U.S., not NAZI Germany, nor Italy, was the best ally of Japan. (From 1937 to 1945, 21,000,000 Chinese lost their lives, among whom about 3.8 million were soldiers, officers and generals. General consensus of total death toll could amount to 38 million, including possibly millions of Chinese prisoners of war who were killed by the Japanese army.) From 1937 to 1938, the U.S. provided 290 million U.S. dollars' worth of war materials to Japan under the Neutrality Act, with 190 million alone in year 1939. After the outbreak of the 1937 war, the U.S. supplied 18 million U.S. dollars' worth of war planes to Japan, seven times more than the planes' sale in 1937. Another 190 million U.S. dollars' worth of war materials were sold to Japan in 1940. Prior to the U.S. revocation of the U.S.-Japan commerce treaty on January 26, 1940, Japan organized six procurement delegations to the U.S. and obtained 500 million U.S. dollars' worth of supplies from the U.S., including 36 million U.S. dollars' moulding-tool "master machine" equipment for manufacturing the artillery and other heavy military equipment. In August 1940 alone, over 300,000 tons of U.S. scrap irons and raw irons were sold to Japan. In 1941, the U.S. sold to Japan 131% more petrol oil to Japan than in 1940, which was to say that the Japanese planes that bombed the Pearl Harbor used the U.S.-made petrol oil. Altogether, prior to the Pearl Harbor attack [which ensued from the U.S. freezing the Japan assets and ordering the oil embargo on July 25, 1941, i.e., the Soviet Snow Operation orchestrated by Harry Dexter White], the U.S. provided at least 1 billion U.S. dollars' worth of supplies to Japan, including scrap irons, steel, special steel (alloy steel), nickel, cobalt, tungsten, chemicals, etc., with 70% for the military purpose. (What happened was that the Japanese, through two American missionaries, opened a channel of secret negotiations with the United States, that resulted in a to-be-signed memorandum with about five points for solution of the "China Incident", namely, the United States would pressure the Republic of China into accepting the state of puppet Manchukuo and waiving the demand for the Japanese war indemnity on the precondition that Japan withdrew its invasion army from China proper. Later, this secret U.S.-Japan agreement was to be overturned by Matsuoka Yosuke who reached a non-aggression treaty with the U.S.S.R. on April 13th, 1941, with the direct consequence of eruption of the Pearl Harbor attack.) Before the war, the U.S. provided Japan with 181 million U.S. dollars' worth of weapons and arsenals to meet Japan's purported 1937-1942 six-year war plan against the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, the DuPond group sold Japan the chemical technology for manufacturing bombs; the Ford group transferred the metallurgy technology to Japan; the Rockefeller group assisted Japan with building the electronics industry; and the Mellon group modernized Japan's aviation. Only Japanese Akira Ariye understood this part of the U.S.-Japanese history. (Of course, the same synarchists built the armaments' factories for the Soviets in the Ural mountains.) The Lend-lease Amounts: The actual American lend-lease amounts for the time period of 1940-1944 were smaller than Stalin and the Soviets' aid of 250 million USD from 1937-1940. Stalin's generosity was the result of the Soviet scheme to provoke the Sino-Japanese War in order to make China into a blood pool to tie down Japan, an exact word used by Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov in his memoirs to describe the effect of the Sino-Japanese War on the Soviet Union. The itemized amounts were merely: US$26 million (1941, mostly squandered in Burma in the aftermath of the Japanese invasion), US$100 million (1942), US$49 million (1943), and US$53 million (1944). (Numbers were from Arthur Young, economic adviser to the Republic of China and one of the few Americans who harbored true sympathy with China and the Chinese people. For comparison's sake, we want to list the amounts from the communist money laundering: i) Chen Hansheng's laundering 20 million US dollars to Yenan through the CPUSA and the leftist and communist front organizations in the U.S.; ii) communist actress Wang Ying's donation collection activities in Southeast Asia, that could amount to 10-20 million US dollars; and the Japanese foreign ministry's funneling of over 3 billion yens of funds to the Chinese communists through Pan Hannian, equivalent to 25 million US dollars, according to Endo Homare, the only survivor of her family from the 1948 communist siege and blockade of Changchun that led to the starvation death of 300,000 civilians.) 
Rather receiving any benefits from the lend lease, the Chinese side had spent enormous resource on supporting the American operation. The airfields completely bankrupted China's wartime finance and led to spiraling inflation from 1942 to 1945, which replayed again from 1947 to 1949 when George Marshall left China. Wellington Koo's memoirs often talked about some amount related to the INVERSE LEND LEASE, an amount that the Americans owed to China. Wellington Koo, throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, were constantly working with the Americans to balance out the dollar amount of aid from the Americans and the dollar amount of the financial support that R.O.C. provided to the Americans. After Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek requested for a loan with the U.S. Back on December 30th, Chiang Kai shek, in light of inadequate usage of the Lend-Lease Act aid, had asked the American government for a loan of five hundred million dollars, and asked the British government for a similar sum. A mechanism was proposed to devise a proxy "Trade Dollar" currency to "directly compensate each of one million Chinese soldiers at the rate of ten American dollars a month, five for pay, and five for maintenance" -- a scheme that Churchill endorsed to Roosevelt and Morgenthau. Morgenthau sold the panoply to T.V. Soong, with Chiang replying that the cleavage between the Chinese soldiers compensated in this manner could hasten the collapse of the Chinese economy and that this advance of funds should require no security or other terms for the cause of fighting the common enemy. Morgenthau's people, with Soviet agents included of course, continued to oppose the loan to China, with a deliberate suggestion to pool in the Soviets for contribution. This led to Morgenthau's query with Litvinov on January 29th, which Litvinov flatly declined and furthermore commented on it as Chiang's blackmail. Nevertheless, with Singapore to fall to the Japanese and the Burma battles to be started anytime, cool heads reached a consensus to grant such a loan, which was promptly stamped by both the House and Senate. On March 14, 1941, the Chinese Ministry of Finance issued two government treasuries of US$100 million, with one long term bond termed the "Allied victory bond" and the other short term bill in the form of short term certificates, that were backed by the new American credit at the rate of 20 CNC for one American dollar; however, there was not much enthusiam for subscription to the bonds and certficates until July 1943, when there was suspicious heavy rush-buying, which stirred accusation of corruption against H.H. Kung. There was one important episode recorded in Roosevelt's conversations with Chiang, namely, the Burma campaign and the promised aid to China. After Roosevelt left Cairo, both promises were broken. In the aftermath of the American and British negating decisions made at Cairo for the Second Burma Campaign, there was back and forth discussions within the U.S. to refuse such a loan. As to the billion-dollar loan, ambassador Gauss, when called to Chiang's office, and when Mme Chiang spoke of the cost to maintain the American air force, was "unmoved". In a despatch to the State Department on December 23rd, Gauss claimed that "China would not be helped by an American dollar alone at this time" and implied that only successful military operations to open the Ledo Road could have resolved the inflation issue with increased transport of goods. Hull, a good man, suggested a "soft" refusal blunting the effect of a flat denial's impacting the Chinese morale as well as suggested the Treasury Department to send a fact-finding kind of mission to China. The Treasury Department, where Soviet spy Harry Dexter White was at work, did not support the loan either, claiming that it might "retard the decline in the value of the Chinese dollar" and slow up inflation "not much or for long". Morgenthau, claiming that the loan was unnecessary and undesirable, suggested some lesser measures to "reduce the volume of Chinese currency". Roosevelt, on January 5th, 1944, ordered that Morgenthau's memo with reasons that the loan was not justified be sent to Chiang. Hull wanted Gauss to blunt the impact when presenting the memo to Chiang. The Americans took the Chinese threat as a blackmail, and thought that Chiang could possibly withhold the Yoke force from going into Burma as a bargaining chip. In January of 1944, the War Department thought about curtailing operations in China. Somervell, Marshall and Stimson were all fed up. The disputes continued, surrounded two issues: Mme Chiang insisted that Roosevelt promised to meet the full cost of constructing the American bomber base at Chengdu (Chengtu), and the American War Department was unwilling to convert the U.S. dollars at the official CNC exchange rate of 20:1, which would amount to an expenditure of 100 million dollars each month to maintain operation in China. China claimed that if using the black market rate, let's say 130 CNC to 1 U.S. dollar, then granting such an exchange rate would ruin the Chinese currency. On the Chinese side, Chiang thought that the loan was trivial in comparison with the outlay doled out to the British and Russians. H.H. Kung suggested in January of 1944 that the Americans themselves had to "arrange to buy the supplies, labor, and construction materials" after March 1st, 1944, as seen in Gauss' despatch on January 16th. In talks with the U.S. State Department, H.H. Kung stated: "It cost us something about ninety CNC dollars to feed an American soldier a day...We in China are vegetable eaters...in China your boys need six eggs a day, and now it is cut down to four eggs. But you eat a pound of beef a day. In Kunming alone we are keeping cows and oxen to supply you... 12,000 catties of beef alone every day...in this country you raise animals for the purpose of meat; in China we don’t do that. In order to supply the meat we are feeding our oxen, used for farming purposes." Wesley Marvin Bagby, following the paper trail of the Comintern agents, while acknowledging that "the number of the American troops in China rose from 1,255 at the end of 1942, to 60,369 by August 1945...and that...carnivorous Americans decimated water buffalo, the principal nonhuman energy input into Chinese farming," did not appreciate a thing about China's contribution to the war efforts. The War Department then "had second and softer thoughts", and it appeared that Stimson came up with "a temporary working compromise on war costs and the exchange rate" in a memo sent to Roosevelt on May 26th, 1944, that "did little to ease the [Sino-American] tension during the spring of 1944--while the second campaign in Burma was being fought". For the year 1945 to the V-J Day: US$642 million. (This is on basis of Utley's citation of the U.S. number of approximately $870,000,000 up to V-J Day, deducted by Young's numbers of $228 million from 1941 to 1944.) For the time period from the V-J Day to the end of February 1946: US$600 million (mostly the transportation costs). (This is on basis of Utley's citation of the U.S. number. Out of the above ambiguous post-1944 U.S. numbers, Utley deducted: $335.8 million represented by the cost of repatriating the Japanese and accepting their surrender; $100 million worth of the "surplus" United States stocks sold to China in 1946, 40 per cent consisting of the quartermaster supplies, and only $3 million consisting of the small-arms and ammunition. As pointed out by Utley, the largest single item in Acheson's total of $797.7 million of military aid was the "services and expenses" amounting to $335.8 million, and listed under the heading of "Postwar Lend-Lease.") This webmaster's conviction is that China's economic woes of 1942-1945 and 1947-1949, psychologically related, both were related to the American sabotage, i.e., alternatively, by what Hurley called the colonialists and communists inside of the American government. The American aid to wartime China was completely sabotaged by i) the colonialists and ii) the communists inside of the U.S. government. The overwhelming slander against the government of the Republic of China was the consequence of the collusion of the colonialists (i.e., what Roosevelt suspected to be a house of the British hands in the State Department) and the communists (i.e., the undercover Comintern agents) inside of the U.S. government. The unchanging theme of bad-mouthing the R.O.C and eulogizing the Chinese Communists since the 1940s, however, had to do with the underlying logic behind "The China Exception: Russian Communism being wicked, the Chinese are good communists", which is an inherent fear of the Yellow Peril, i.e., the one billion Chinese would actually enjoy real democracy, go to college and develop their intelligence. A communist China, that suppresses its very own people, hence serves the purpose of nipping the Yellow Peril. Before President Roosevelt, there was President Wilson's China policy, which this webmaster referred to as the 100-year American hypocrisy. It was pivoted from the hypocritical nature of America's Open Door Policy for China, which was originally an idea sold to the Americans by the British career customs officer working in Manchu China's customs office. During WWI, President Wilson, who was in the shoes and mindset of the British colonialists, believed that the U.S. had to keep China intact for securing the fate of the white civilization, while during WWII, the British impressed the Americans with the inverse of the former doctrine to state that a victorious Republic of China, which was to emerge from WWII, would pose a threat to the white civilization. The reason that China should remain open to all powers, in the opinion of U.S. president Thomas Woodrow Wilson, was that the 'white civilization' and its domination in the world rested largely on the ability to keep China intact, in the sense that should China fall completely under the Japanese [or the Tsarist Russian or someone else's] influence, then the massive Chinese manpower could be utilized like by Genghis Khan to conquer the world. This was the theme of the Yellow Peril, which was inverse to what the British ambassador claimed to Albert Wedemeyer during WWII that a strong and unified China would pose a threat to the White men’s position in the Far East and immediately throughout the world. So to say that the nation of China should be managed delicately, that is, should not be allowed to grow too powerful to pose a threat to the white civilization, nor should it be allowed to be hijacked by a non-U.S. power since China's immense human labor could be turned against the [Anglo-American{-Jewish}] white civilization. (Do not forget that the British, who damaged China enormously through the two opium wars of the 19th century, forged twenty years of military alliance with Japan, that built the warships and warplanes used for invading China --knowing that the Republic of China, the beacon tower, represented the last bastion against the imperialists and colonialists. More available at "Changing Alliances On International Arena", "Century-long American hypocrisy towards China", "Anglo-American & Jewish romance with Japanese", "American's Unpositive Neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War", "Joe Stilwell's Authorization To Assassinate Chiang Kai-shek", and "What Foreign Powers Did To The Flowery Republic Prior To, During And After The 1911 Revolution".) 
The American Involvement in China: Soviet Operation Snow, the IPR Conspiracy, the Dixie Mission, the Stilwell Incident, the OSS Scheme, the Coalition Government Crap, the Amerasia Case, & The China White Paper [Modified : Monday, 25-Feb-2013 22:00:00 EST] There are many kinds of Americans, like those sharing the British colonial sentiments, like those who were Soviet spies, like those who unconsciously worked as the communist fellow travelers, and like those [Kerr] who despised Chiang Kai-shek's background and personality. There are last two categories, i.e., missionary Americans and true sympathizers for the Chinese cause, including Chennault who was shouldered to the airport by the Chinese in a jeep, and John Birch who devoted his life to the missionary duty in China. [http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2000/04-24-2000/vo16no09_birch.htm] We Chinese need to discern the truth and know who are our friends and who are not. We need to bear the lesson from true and real history, not to be misled by the perjured or fake history. Till we fully appreciate the help of good-hearted and sympathetic Americans such as Anson Burlingame, Paul Samuel Reinsch, Patrick Jay Hurley, Claire Lee Chennault, Milton Miles and Albert Wedemeyer, Arthur Young, and John Birch, and build the ever-lasting and eternal monuments in remembrance of them, there would not be another American who would follow their footsteps. Note that Reinsch, after leaving the minister-to-China's post, continued to work on behalf of China and died of illness while working for China. The Chinese should forever pay respect to Reinsch and his descendants. (A good Hollywood movie could be shot in regards to Birch's behind-the-enemy-line work along the Southeast China coast, along the Yangtze, along the Peking-Hankow Railway, and along the Yellow River flood line. Another movie could be made for the behind-the-enemy-line collaboration efforts by Milton Miles and Dai Li. Both Chennault's 14th Flight Group intelligence operations and Miles' navy intelligence operations were hijacked by the Soviet-agents-controlled O.S.S.) Videos about China's Resistance War: China's Dunkirk Retreat (in English); 42 Video Series (in Chinese)
Every righteous Chinese will be indignant about what he is to discover next !!!!!!!!!
The China Story by Freda Utley Chapter 2, Too Little, Too Late -- The Facts About "Aid to China" **** Summaries from The China Story by Freda Utley Chapter 2, Too Little, Too Late -- 1) Following Japan's surrender, shipments of Lend-Lease supplies to China from India were stopped, and large quantities of munitions and equipment intended for China were destroyed, or thrown into the sea. Smaller caliber ammunition was blown up, and 120,000 tons of larger caliber dumped into the Indian Ocean.2/ This "Operation Destruction" cost the lives of twenty-five Americans and one hundred and twenty-five Indians. Yet, these destroyed munitions are to be found included in the total of "pre-V-J Day Lend-Lease" charged to China's account. 2) The standard Chinese Nationalist rifle ammunition was the same as the German 7.92 mm. Had the Administration desired to help create a "strong, independent and friendly China," ample ammunition could therefore have been supplied at no cost to the National Government after Germany's defeat. The supply of German light arms and ammunition to China was urgently recommended by General Wedemeyer following V-E Day, and shipment was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A first consignment of twenty thousand rifles had actually left a German port for China, but was stopped en route by an order signed by Lauchlin Currie on White House stationery, forbidding any such aid to China. Ultimately a part of what could so easily have been given to China ended up in Russian hands in East Germany, and the rest was destroyed. 3) Lend-lease assistance was extended to China to assist her in fighting the Japanese, and later to fulfill our promise to assist in re-occupying the country from the Japanese. Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services, such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops. According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to V-J Day totaled approximately $870,000,000. From V-J Day to the end of February [1946], shortly after General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately $600,000,000 -- mostly its transportation costs. Thus, in our analysis of the actual military aid given to China after Japan's defeat, we must first deduct the $335.8 million represented by the cost of repatriating the Japanese and accepting their surrender. This leaves us with a total of $461.9 million of postwar military aid to China. This figure must be further reduced by eliminating the non-military "surplus war stocks" sold to China in 1946, which Mr. Acheson also includes in his total of "military aid." For as noted in the previous chapter reviewing General Marshall's mission to China, President Truman, in the summer of 1946, expressly prohibited any further acquisition by China of arms or ammunition which could be used to fight the Communists. So the "surplus" United States war stocks sold to China in 1946 included little of any military value to the National Government. Out of the total of $100 million worth of "surplus" United States stocks sold to China in 1946, 40 per cent consisted of quartermaster supplies, and only $3 million consisted of the small-arms and ammunition required in the war against the Communists. It is true that some armaments, such as large-caliber artillery pieces, were included, but these were not of a kind, as I shall show later, which could be used in fighting the Communists. The same can be said of such items as the half-million gas masks, priced at $8 apiece--total $4,000,000--which the Chinese Government presumably bought for the value of the rubber to the civilian economy. Elimination of both the "services" charges and of the $100 million or so of United States non-military "war surplus" stocks sold to China in 1946 reduces the total of postwar "military aid" to China to about $360 million. This total is disputed by the Chinese National Government. According to its calculations, China received $110 million worth of "effective military aid" prior to the 1948 China Aid Act, which, together with the $125 million allocated by that Act, brought the total to $225 million. Whichever figure is correct, the total sum is far less than the "billions" which are popularly assumed to have been squandered to no purpose. 4) In a letter to Senator Connally on March 15, 1949, Mr. Aches stated more explicitly that United States aid to China since V-J Day totaled "over $2 billion." He wrote: "Despite the present aid program authorized by the last Congress, together with the very substantial other aid extended by the United States to China since V-J Day, aggregating over $2 billion, the economic and military position of the Chinese Government has deteriorated to the point where the Chinese Communists hold almost all important areas of China from Manchuria to the Yangtze River and have the military ability . . . of eventually dominating South China. . . . The Chinese Government forces have lost no battles during the past year because of lack of ammunition and equipment, while the Chinese Communists have captured the major portion of military supplies, exclusive of ammunition, furnished the Chinese Government by the United States since V-J Day. There is no evidence that the furnishing of additional military materiel would alter the pattern of current developments in China (italics added)."
Let us first break down that $2 billion total into its component parts, with a view to ascertaining the actual amounts of military aid given the National Government of China to resist Communist aggression. According to the figures given on pages 1043-44 of The China White Paper, Mr. Acheson's over-all figure of $2 billion of postwar aid to China includes a total of $799 million of "economic aid," and $797.7 million of "military aid," which together add up to something over $1.5 billion. The balance of the $2 billion is not itemized, but presumably includes the United States' share of UNRRA aid, which is calculated to have amounted to $474 million. The largest single item in Mr. Acheson's total of $797.7 million of military aid is "services and expenses" amounting to $335.8 million, and listed under the heading "Postwar Lend-Lease." The "services" referred to consisted of the cost of repatriating the million or more Japanese soldiers in China, and of transporting the Chinese Nationalist forces to accept the surrender of the Japanese Army in the liberated territories. According to President Truman, these "services" cannot properly be regarded as "postwar" Lend-Lease, but must be included under the heading of World War II expenditures. 5) Before proceeding to an account of the 1948 China Aid Act, it is necessary to examine the consequences of General Marshall's 1946-47 embargo on the shipment of arms or ammunition to China, and President Truman's insistence that no help should be given to the anti-Communist forces in the so-called "civil war." Colonel L. B. Moody, a United States Army Ordinance Corps officer, now retired, who served with the Donald Nelson mission to China, has made an intensive and detailed study of aid to China. In a speech in Washington on April 11, 1950, he said that in China ..."the massive support of artillery, tanks, motor transport and aircraft to which western armies are accustomed is practically non-existent. The side which has the predominating infantry weapons, and especially the ammunition therefore, holds all the aces...It is obvious that "military aid" means to the Chinese infantry weapons and ammunition above all else, and it is precisely these items which the United States action has consistently denied, delayed or limited. Only passing reference will be made to the billions of moldy cigarettes, blown-up guns, junk bombs, and disabled vehicles from the Pacific Islands, which have been totaled up with other real or alleged "aid" in various State Department, Communist, and leftist statements to create the impression that we have furnished the Nationalist Government with hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars' worth of useful fighting equipment..." From the start of Japanese aggression to this evening the prime need of the Nationalist Armies has been, in the language of Joe Stilwell, "Bullets, D**n it, just bullets." 6) Colonel Moody also drew attention to the fact that the Chinese Communist admissions concerning their own casualties disproved the popular assumption that the Nationalist forces lost because of poor morale. For the Chinese Communist command reported that in the three years of civil war from July 1946 to July 1949, the number of their killed and wounded was 1,233,600. This is greater than the total of American casualties in World War II. 7) General Marshall's embargo on the sale of American arms and ammunition to the Nationalist forces in China was not lifted until July 1947, when the State Department allowed the Chinese Government to purchase some three weeks' supply of 7.92 mm. ammunition -- 130 million rounds. Chiang Kai-shek had been endeavoring, for a year, to get permission from the State Department to be allowed to acquire this ammunition, which could not be sold to anyone else because it had been made during World War II according to Chinese specifications. One other small boon was vouchsafed to the Nationalists in 1947. The Marines and the Navy, when ordered to leave China, gave them a six days' supply for their .30 caliber weapons. Colonel Moody calculates that in December 1947 at the normal rate of use, the total of ammunition in possession of the Nationalists was sufficient for only twenty-two days in the case of the Chinese 7.92 mm. weapons; and for thirty-six days in the case of the Chinese 7.92 mm. weapons; and for thirty-six days in the case of their .30 caliber-U.S.--guns. 8) The White Paper emphasizes the aid that was supplied to China early in 1948 by permitting the National Government to buy, at bargain prices, the stores which had been rotting on Pacific Islands. But it does not mention the fact that the "surplus" ammunition made available to China in January 1948 consisted mainly of types useless to the Chinese Nationalist forces. Colonel Moody’s detailed analysis shows that of the total offered only 3 per cent was of the required groundforce types, and only 2 per cent of useful air-force types, and not all of this was serviceable. Only 52,500 cartridges of the .30 caliber they required for their American rifles and machine guns were to be found, accounting for one-fortieth of one per cent of the total supplies made available to them. Certain other types of small-arms ammunition they could use brought the total tonnage to sixty-three tons, less than two-thirds of one per cent of the total shipped. This was at a time when the anti-Communist forces in China were going into battle with barely enough ammunition to fill their cartridge belts. The Chinese contracted from their own funds for the 10,000 tons of ammunition that was made available to them at bargain prices early in 1948, because although little of it consisted of what they required, they hoped to make future use of it. For instance, they bought a stock of large-caliber shells in order to extract the explosive for mining and industrial operations, or to use in Chinese arsenals for loading the ammunition they made for themselves. But by making these purchases they enabled the State Department to claim that large supplies of munitions had been made available to fight the Communists, which was not so. In the period December 1947 to November 1948 (when munitions voted in April 1948 in the China Aid Act began to arrive) the total of "surplus" United States ammunition sold to the Chinese provided only a month’s supply for the weapons they had and could use. Chinese production could provide only 7 to 8 per cent of requirements. Colonel Moody therefore calculates that the total of Chinese-produced and American rifle and machine-gun ammunition produced or acquired in 1948 amounted to only some sixty-three days’ supply in active operations. 9) A couple of months later the Chinese delegate to the United Nations, Dr. T. F. Tsiang, appealed to Secretary of State Marshall in Paris. He asked if anything would induce the United States to help China. He offered to put United States officers in actual command of Chinese troops "under the pretense of acting as advisers." He begged for munitions. And, finally, he asked General Marshall "as to the advisability of Chinese appeal to the United Nations because of Soviet training and equipping of Japanese military and also the Koreans." 10) In the fall of 1948, William C. Bullitt, on his return from a visit to China, reported that "the so-called mission sent to aid Chiang" had been instructed "not to advise him" with regard to the operation of his forces. The former Ambassador and confidant of Franklin D. Roosevelt further stated that "nearly half of the 1500-man military "mission" was composed of fellow travelers and Communist sympathizers." 11) In his report General Barr provides an answer to the charge so assiduously propagated that the Nationalist forces allowed their equipment to be captured by the Communists. In China, ages of lean living developed a capacity to make use in some way or another of what others would regard as refuse; thus the Chinese have acquired what General Barr calls an "inherent" inability to destroy anything of value. General Barr describes their failure to destroy equipment when forced to surrender or retreat as due to this characteristic. It should also be noted here that Mr. Acheson himself in his letter to Senator Connally quoted at the beginning of this chapter admits that ammunition was not captured by the Communists from the National forces. This evidence suggests that the latter surrendered because they ran out of ammunition. 12) Let us now resume our account of the record of "aid to China." General Marshall’s embargo on shipment of aid to the anti-Communist forces was, as we have already seen, lifted in the summer of 1947. The small quantity of munitions which China was then allowed to buy was considered by the Chinese Government as the only effective aid against the Communists which America had permitted them to obtain since General Marshall went to China. Finally, in 1948, the Administration, as a result of the Republican control of the House of Representatives in the 80th Congress, was compelled to include a grant of $125 million of military aid to China in the China Aid Act, originally presented only as an economic aid program. But the Chinese Government was nevertheless unable to procure the munitions it so desperately needed until nearly the end of the year. On April 5, 1948, the Chinese Ambassador in Washington made his first request for implementation of the Act. Two months went by with the Chinese pleading in vain to be allowed to make their wants known and start procuring supplies with the funds appropriated by Congress for this purpose. At last, on June 2, President Truman (who had that same day received a strongly worded letter from Senator Bridges, the Chairman of the "Watch Dog" Committee) wrote to Secretary of State Marshall and to the Treasury advising them of the procedures to be followed in permitting China to make use of the sums appropriated. General Marshall waited over three weeks, until June 28, before so advising the Chinese Ambassador. Even then the Chinese could not acquire arms and ammunition because the President had authorized only commercial transactions, and the munitions required could be obtained only from Government stocks. Another month passed before the President issued a directive authorizing United States Government departments and agencies to transfer military materiel from their own stocks, or procure it for the Chinese Government. (A year later the State Department was to point with pride to its "initiative" in having arranged the procedures for China to obtain supplies by July 28--nearly four months after the China Aid Act was passed!)
13 ) As Vice Admiral Russell S. Berkey said on May 15, 1950: The Chinese Reds would still be north of the Great Wall if specific items of arms authorized by Congress two years ago had reached the Nationalist forces in time. For some reason or other it took nine months to get specific items to China. Somewhere in the United States somebody slipped up, bogged down, or was interfered with. It has never been made plain why this material did not arrive in time. Even at the end of July munitions did not start rolling to China. From the State Department the matter went to the Army Department, which said it could not act, or even specify the prices at which munitions would be sold, until after it had spent several weeks on "availability studies." It was not until late in September that these studies were completed. The Chinese then found that they were to be charged prices five to ten times higher than the thirty-odd other nations permitted to buy United States munitions. This drastic reduction of the total amounts they had expected to obtain under the China Aid Act necessitated the drawing up of new lists. This occasioned another, though only short, delay. The Army Department, however, now informed the Chinese that they could not expect shipment before early 1949. In October, President Truman (influenced perhaps by the fact that the delay in getting arms to China had become an election campaign issue) issued expediting instructions, and the first substantial shipment of arms to China left Seattle on November 9, 1948. By this time the Communists had conquered the greater part of China. The President’s October directive was succeeded by more delays. "Availability studies," priorities, export licenses, and so forth, snarled deliveries once again, so that by April 30, 1949--thirteen months after Congress had voted arms aid for China--nearly a quarter of the supplies to be furnished had not yet been shipped. In addition, the total amount of munitions China was permitted to buy with the $125 million turned out to be only about one-eighth of what had been expected. It had been assumed by Congress and the Chinese Government that the prices charged would be the same as to Greece and Turkey, not to mention the thirty-odd other nations to whom "surplus" munitions were sold at 10 per cent of list price cost. Instead, when at last on August 31, 1948, the Army had progressed far enough in its "availability studies" to give prices on some items of arms and ammunition, the Chinese discovered they would be required to pay more than double published prices, and an average of 50 per cent in excess of current commercial quotations for new manufacturers. There was no possibility of obtaining the arms or ammunition from any private sources. The Army was in fact charging the Chinese a monopoly price.
14) Most of America’s postwar economic aid to China consisted of immediate relief to the homeless and starving. Little was provided to remove the causes of starvation. UNRRA aid, the greater part of which was provided by the United States, consisted mainly of food and clothing. Some undertakings were financed which would have been constructive if the Communists had been prevented from destroying every dam, railway, mine, or industry reconstructed with UNRRA aid. For instance, Communist guerrillas quickly destroyed the Yellow River flood rehabilitation work of UNRRA engineers, constructed at a cost of millions of dollars. They similarly destroyed roads and railways repaired with UNRRA funds. While engaged in this deliberate destruction, they were receiving UNRRA relief supplies. For we insisted that a due proportion of UNRRA aid be furnished to Communist areas. 15) The Communists by this time seemed to have been so well supplied with everything they required that they refused UNRRA relief and medical supplies, rather than allow American personnel to enter their territory. According to a New York Times dispatch from Peiping dated June 21, 1947, Cornelius Bodine, of Philadelphia, the UNRRA director for the Changchun area, was twice refused entry to Communist-controlled areas of Manchuria. The Communists evidently desired to prevent at all costs foreign observers from learning how much help Russia was giving them. 16) According to the Chinese Central News Agency, thirty thousand Japanese "prisoners" and ninety tanks were backing the Communist offensive in Manchuria. Its Mukden correspondent reported early in June that "a special bureau" of "a certain nation" had supplied the Communists with equipment for twenty divisions, and that citizens of that "certain nation"--the usual designation for Russia in the Chinese press--or Japanese were manning the tanks that were spearheading the Communist offensive. The eventuality feared all through the Sino-Japanese War had become a reality; the Communists were fighting together with the Japanese against China under Russia’s orders. In March 1947, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, a U.S. commander in Korea, stated that Chinese Communist troops were participating in the training of a Korean army of 500,000 in Russian-held North Korea. The Chinese Central News Agency stated in June that more than 100,000 Russian-trained Koreans plus a cavalry division from Outer Mongolia were in action against the Chinese Nationalist forces. As General Pai Chung-hsi, the Minister of Defense, stated on May 1, 1947, the government’s military progress had been blocked by the truces and peace talks of the preceding year. "Immediately after the recovery of Kalgan (October 1946)," said the Kwangsi general, who is regarded as China’s foremost strategist, "we could have blasted open the whole Peiping-Hankow Railway, but our actions were deferred by intervals of negotiation. The government has suffered from an irresolute policy." By June 1947, when prophecies were already being made in the American press that Manchuria would be lost to China, the National Government at last realized that its long silence concerning Russia’s hostile acts had merely emboldened the Soviet Government to increase its aid to the Chinese Communists, and that United States help was unlikely to be forthcoming until the American people were informed of the true facts of the Far Eastern situation. On June 25, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communique detailing for the first time the long record of Soviet obstruction to China’s attainment of her rights under the Sino-Soviet Treaty. "Sources close to the Generalissimo" were reported by American correspondents to be saying that Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers were framing a new policy calling for a stronger stand against Russian aggression. The policy of silence and appeasement was being abandoned, but the extent to which China would go toward a diplomatic showdown with Russia would depend upon United States support. General Chen Cheng, the Chinese Chief of Staff, charged on June 24 that at least thirty-one Russian advisers were known to be with the Communist forces fighting at Szepingkai, the important railroad point seventy miles from Mukden. The Chinese Nationalist commander in besieged Szepingkai said that the Communists had battered the city with 100,000 artillery shells and that Russian-trained Koreans manned the Communist guns. Following the lifting of the siege by Nationalist forces at the end of June, the Chinese Central News Agency accused Russia of having shipped 56,635 tons of military supplies to the Chinese Communists in June, twelve Soviet ships having unloaded supplies for them at Dairen, while others ran a shuttle service between the Manchurian part and Chefoo, the Shantung port occupied by the Communists. So in 1946 and in 1947 the Chinese Nationalist commanders found themselves unable to crack the Communist line north to Dairen for fear of encroaching on Russia’s newly established extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil. In the fall of 1946, according to Christopher Rand of the New York Herald Tribune, two Communist regiments had taken refuge at Port Arthur from Nationalist attack, and sheltered there until they emerged in the spring of 1947 to take in the Communists’ greatest offensive. As Tillman Durdin of the New York Times reported in April 1947, the Communist forces were backed up against the Russian "defense zone" running from Port Arthur in back of Dairen, and the Chinese Government feared the "complications" which would arise if the Communists retreated into Russian-occupied territory. On July 4, the National Government, after rallying its forces for a successful counter-offensive in Manchuria, announced its abandonment of all hope for a political solution of the Communist problem and denounced the Communists as "armed rebels" who could be dealt with only by force. Vice President Sun Fo, so long an advocate of Sino-Soviet friendship and collaboration, was reported to be one of the leading advocates of this resolution, which marked the end of China’s "Coue diplomacy" and placed her unequivocally in the world anti-Communist camp. It was at this juncture that the United States Administration relented sufficiently to permit the Chinese Nationalists to buy 130 million rounds of ammunition in the United States. General Marshall, however, denied on July 2, 1947, that America was not supporting the Nationalist Government against the Communists. It was still the proclaimed policy of the United States to deny aid to China until the civil war ended, which meant in effect until Chiang Kai-shek came to terms with Stalin. The Chinese were still hoping that the logic of facts would eventually convince America that there was no sense in stalling Soviet aggression in Europe while leaving our back door on the Pacific undefended. They had resisted Japan for years without our help, hoping that eventually we would become their allies. They hoped to be able to continue resisting Russia as long. But there is a limit to human endurance, and hope constantly deferred maketh the heart sick. By 1949 even inveterate enemies of the Communists saw no further possibility of resistance, in the face of United States’ refusal either of aid or moral support. China went down before the overwhelming might of Soviet Russia’s satellite forces, while the "Voice of America" broadcast praise of the Chinese Communists. The China Story by Freda Utley Chapter 2, Too Little, Too Late -- The Facts About "Aid to China" 
Written by Ah Xiang
1945-1949 Civil War Liao-Shen Campaign Korean War Vietnamese War |
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Republican China in Blog Format 
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![Though, Anna Wang [Anneliese Martens], in her memoirs, expressed jealousy over Gong Peng by stating that the Anglo-American reporters had flattered the Chinese communists and the communist movement as a result of being entranced with the goldfish-eye'ed personal assistant of Zhou Enlai](GongPeng.jpg)
alt="3300 TONS OF PETROL FROM RUSSIANS IN 1947 ALONE; PLUS 2000 TONS OF DIESEL, 1000 TONS OF PLANE FUEL, 700 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES & 2000 TONS OF MACHINERY OIL" title="3300 TONS OF PETROL FROM RUSSIANS IN 1947 ALONE; PLUS 2000 TONS OF DIESEL, 1000 TONS OF PLANE FUEL, 700 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES & 2000 TONS OF MACHINERY OIL"
